In 2015, Atlassian was preparing to go public. It had more than 51,000 customers across more than 160 countries. Its software was already being used by 79 of the Fortune 100 and 273 of the Fortune 500.
For an enterprise software company, those numbers were impressive. But another number made the story much more interesting.
More than 98% of Atlassian's transactions were happening through its website.
Atlassian had built a large B2B software business without relying on the traditional sales infrastructure that defined much of enterprise software. Prospects could find the product, see the pricing, try it, buy it and start using it with very little human intervention.
The company had not removed selling from the business. It had changed where much of the selling happened.
The Sales Process Started Before Sales
Traditional enterprise software buying often involved a familiar sequence. Marketing generated interest. A prospect became a lead. Sales arranged conversations and demonstrations. Pricing entered the discussion. Negotiations followed. Eventually, the customer bought the software and started using it.
Atlassian designed much of the early journey differently.
Its pricing was visible. Teams could evaluate products online. Small groups could start using the software without waiting for a traditional enterprise buying process. On a typical business day in September 2015, Atlassian said its website received more than 70,000 visitors and generated more than 6,500 free product evaluations.
That meant thousands of potential customers were not simply reading marketing material about what Jira or Confluence could do. They were experiencing the products themselves.
This distinction matters in B2B marketing.
A demonstration tells a buyer what a product can do. A trial allows the buyer to decide whether it actually does it.
Atlassian's products were affordable enough for teams to start relatively small, and the company deliberately made that initial adoption easy. Its IPO filing described the model as self-service and low-friction, designed to let users get started within minutes rather than requiring assistance from a traditional sales force.
But making the first purchase easy would not have been nearly as powerful if the first purchase was also where the relationship ended.
It wasn't.
A Small Purchase Could Become Seven Times Larger
Atlassian's model depended heavily on what happened after a team started using the software.
A user could introduce another user. One team could lead to another team. A product initially used for one purpose could spread into other departments or lead to the adoption of additional Atlassian products.
The company described demand as spreading from user to user, team to team and department to department.
And its filings provide unusually clear evidence of the commercial effect.
THE EVIDENCE
More than 98% of transactions were conducted through Atlassian's website.
More than 6,500 free evaluations were generated on a typical business day.
Over five years, customers spent seven times their initial purchase with Atlassian in aggregate.
That final number changes how the initial transaction should be understood.
A small team buying software was not necessarily a small customer forever. The initial purchase could be an entry point into a much larger relationship as more people, teams and products were added.
Today, this kind of approach is commonly discussed as product-led growth. The product plays a central role in acquisition, conversion and expansion rather than appearing only after marketing and sales have completed their work.
But Atlassian was building much of this system before product-led growth became common marketing language.
Its historical filings used simpler descriptions: self-service, low-friction distribution, word of mouth, organic expansion and a high-velocity model.
There was another important part of the system too.
Atlassian was using behavioural data to help customers discover more of its products. Its internal Engagement Engine analysed customer behaviour and could promote additional products based on what users were doing.
So some of the work traditionally associated with marketing and selling was moving into the website, the product, the pricing structure and the technology around the customer experience.
The product was not replacing marketing.
The product had become part of marketing.
The Model Did Not Stay Sales-Free
It would be easy to turn Atlassian's history into a much simpler story: build a great product and you do not need salespeople.
That is not what the evidence shows.
As Atlassian moved further into large enterprises, the needs of the buying environment changed.
Large organisations bring security requirements, procurement, governance, multiple stakeholders, complex deployments and larger commercial relationships. A buying journey that works for a ten-person team does not automatically work for an organisation standardising software across thousands of employees.
Atlassian's current model reflects that reality.
The company still describes its philosophy as product-led. Customers can try products, experience value and begin through self-service. Adoption can spread through an organisation.
But Atlassian now also has a sales force focused particularly on expanding and deepening relationships with large enterprise customers. In its fiscal 2025 filing, the company said its software powered more than 300,000 customers worldwide and more than 80% of the Fortune 500.
The evolution is important because it changes the lesson.
Atlassian did not prove that sales was unnecessary.
It showed that sales does not necessarily have to do every job in the B2B buying journey.
The product can prove value.
The website can answer questions.
Transparent pricing can remove uncertainty.
A trial can reduce the risk of believing a sales claim.
Existing users can create internal demand.
Usage can help another team discover the product.
And when the purchase becomes large, strategic or complicated, human sales can enter where human involvement creates more value.
That is a very different model from automatically putting a salesperson between every interested buyer and the product.
The Question Is Not Product Versus Sales
Atlassian's story is often reduced to its famous lack of a traditional sales force in its earlier years. But that misses the more useful B2B marketing story.
The company did not eliminate the work required to acquire customers.
It redistributed that work.
Some of it happened through brand and word of mouth. Some through the website. Some through transparent pricing. Some through free evaluation. Some inside the product itself. Some through existing users spreading adoption. And as Atlassian moved deeper into large enterprises, more of it could happen through dedicated sales relationships.
That system continues to evolve. Atlassian's 2025 filing still describes a self-service flywheel designed to let customers try the software and experience value first, while its sales force concentrates more heavily on large enterprise expansion.
More than two decades after Atlassian was founded, the interesting question is therefore not whether B2B companies should become product-led or sales-led.
That choice is too simple.
A better question is:
How much of your B2B sales process exists because customers genuinely need a salesperson, and how much exists because you have never designed another way for them to buy?
For marketing leaders, that changes the conversation.
Because sometimes the most important improvement to marketing is not another campaign designed to explain the product.
It is making it easier for the customer to experience the product before anyone has to explain it.
Sources & Further Reading
Atlassian Corporation Plc, Registration Statement / IPO Filing, 2015, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Primary evidence for Atlassian's customer scale, online transaction model, website traffic, free evaluations, word-of-mouth strategy and customer expansion economics.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650372/000104746915008450/a2226437zf-1.htm
Atlassian Corporation Plc, Registration Statement, 2015, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Additional primary evidence on Atlassian's customer-acquisition model, research and development investment, Engagement Engine and expansion strategy.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650372/000155837015001685/filename1.htm
Atlassian Corporation, Fiscal 2025 Annual Report, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Current evidence on Atlassian's product-led philosophy, self-service acquisition model, enterprise sales motion, customer scale and Fortune 500 penetration.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650372/000165037225000036/team-20250630.htm
